THE WAR AND THE COMING PEACE

MORRIS JASTROW, JR.

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THE WAR AND THE COMING PEACE

THE MORAL ISSUE

By MORRIS JASTROW, Jr., Ph.D., LL.D.

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THE MORAL ISSUE

BY

MORRIS JASTROW, Jr., Ph.D., LL.D.

PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

AUTHOR OF "THE WAR AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY," "THE CIVILIZATION OF BABYLONIA AND ASSYRIA," ETC., ETC.

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To

I. F. B.

AND

F. H. B.

PREFACE

THIS book is in a measure an outgrowth of the author's "The War and the Bagdad Railway." In the latter work my main purpose was to show in the light of history the significance of the region through which the Bagdad Railway passes, and how by the conversion of what should have been a purely commercial enterprise into an imperialistic project, backed by a powerful military autocracy, Pan-Germanism became a menace to the entire civilized world. Underlying the menace, however, is a moral issue which was incidentally touched upon in the concluding chapter of the book. While writing the chapter, I felt that the larger, which are also the deeper, aspects of the conflict suggested by the moral issue, merited a fuller treatment. I have, accordingly, yielded to the impulse to set forth in greater detail certain views in regard to this vital issue,

reached as the result of constant reading on the war and on the problem of peace, and which, I trust I am justified in believing, may be of some value to others. The main theme that I endeavor to establish is that both the war and the coming peace are to be viewed from the same angle—from the point of view of what is shown to be the moral issue. For this reason the book has been divided into two parts, one on the war as a moral issue, and the other on the problem of peace.

I have tried to show that the issue may be summed up in a single formula, to wit, that we are fighting an unholy alliance between power and national ambitions, and that this power is exerted in two directions—power as the means of carrying out national policies, and power on the part of a military group, headed by a ruler who embodies in his person the principle of autocracy, as a measure of holding a nation in its tight grasp. These two aspects of power, as represented by the

present German government, are the two sides of a single shield; and one of the main contentions in the unfolding of this theme is to show how Germany's conduct of the war, with its revolting catalogue of wrongs and crimes, as well as its spy system and insidious propaganda, is the direct and *logical* outcome of such an alliance between national ambitions and power, controlled by a group whose necessary concern is its own self-perpetuation.

Back of Germany's conduct of the war, however, lies the responsibility for the war, with all the sufferings it has entailed on the entire world. That, too, is to be traced to the same unholy alliance, and one of my aims in developing the theme is to show how in the history of mankind a moral issue always ensues, when power or the threat of power is used to force a national policy. Even right, when joined with might, leads to an abuse of power and to a menace, against which the world, in defense of lib-

erty and civilization, must needs arm itself.

In dealing with the problem of peace from the same point of view, I have been careful to differentiate between terms of peace and the general question of the kind of peace which should follow the triumph of the moral issue. My concern is solely with the general question, for I feel strongly that not only is it idle to discuss terms of peace while the issue still hangs in the balance, but that this aspect of the study must be left with those who have been entrusted with official authority. What, however, is needed, while the conflict is still going on, is the clarification of public opinion as to what is meant by peace, and how the peace which the world needs can be brought about.

It is important that our statesmen and diplomatists—and this applies to other countries as well as to ours—should be *guided* by public opinion, and this in turn involves that public opinion should become crystallized. It is in the hope of making a modest

contribution towards such an end that I have tried to make clear to myself, and then to set forth for others, the result of constant reading and thought on a subject that has already brought forth a large number of contributions from the best minds in this country, as well as in England and France. Whatever may be the defects of my discussion of the subject—and I lay no claim to any authority except that of an earnest student of existing conditions—it will, I trust, be found to be based on a broad consideration of the theme. I am also in hopes that my main thought in this connection, the avoidance of conditions which will make it possible in the future for a group in any country, representing a government instead of representing a people, either to determine upon war or to arrange the terms of peace, will commend itself to my readers.

I confess to a spirit of optimism, though there is little in the present situation to justify it; and I am prepared for the criticism

that the hope of disarmament and the growth of internationalism after the war, symbolized by an international parliament in some form, is a fanciful dream. It may be so. But, on the other hand, if one's thought is directed towards reading the signs of the times, it must be evident, even to those who look at the facts sternly, without the aid of the imagination, that the world has been moving for some time in the direction of international combinations to carry out high endeavors. This is certainly true in intellectual and commercial fields, as also, though to a less degree, in the realm of international political relations. The war itself in assembling nations of the distant East with those of the West, to defend the bulwarks of civilization and liberty, is a most notable expression of the internationalistic spirit, particularly when we bear in mind that some of these nations not so very long ago looked upon one another as rivals rather than as allies. The remarkable as-

pect of unity presented at present by a large part of the civilized world calls for an interpretation, and I feel that it can have only one meaning—the preparation for the next step that will lead the peoples of the world to a larger recognition of coöperation in an international sense, as a means both to secure peace and to promote the aims of civilization, which can only be carried out through peace. Viewed in this light, the creation of an international parliament in some form, upon the triumph of the moral issue, would appear to be not at all of the nature of an idle dream, but a step suggested by the logic of events, though the realization may not come for some time. It depends upon conditions at the end of the war, and upon the rapidity with which events may move upon the termination of the conflict. All that I have in mind in venturing to set forth certain views is to indicate the direction towards which our gaze should be turned when trying to peer

into the future, at present still hidden under such a thick veil. That veil will be lifted when the menace at present confronting the world shall have been removed.

It only remains for me to express, as on previous occasions, my sense of deep obligation to my wife, who has again given me the benefit of her judgment and criticism in the reading of both the manuscript and the proof. I desire also gratefully to acknowledge a number of valuable suggestions in the treatment of the theme, made by Mr. E. S. Holloway.

MORRIS JASTROW, JR.

PHILADELPHIA, April, 1918

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"Politically, the young are old, and only the old are young. The love of liberty, in the English sense, is to be found in Germany only among men of the generation which, within ten years, will have disappeared.

"And when that time comes, Germany will lie alone, isolated, hated by neighbouring countries; a stronghold of conservatism in the centre of Europe. Around it, in Italy, in France, in Russia in the North, there will rise a generation imbued with international ideas and eager to carry them out in life. But Germany will lie there, old and half stifled in her coat of mail, armed to the teeth and protected by all the weapons of murder and defence which science can invent.

"And there will come great struggles and greater wars. If Germany wins, Europe, in comparison with America, will politically be as Asia in comparison to Europe. But if Germany loses, then . . .

"But it is not seemly to play the prophet." (Written in 1881.)

George Brandes, *The World at War.*

PART I

THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE

THE WAR AND THE COMING PEACE

THE WAR AS A MORAL ISSUE

I

THERE are two ways of looking at the great conflict. We may have regard to the issues that lie at the surface, or we may endeavor to probe to the deeper significance of the war, for there is always an undercurrent to surface events. On the surface, wars reveal race antagonisms, religious dissensions, political ambitions or economic rivalries as the more immediate causes, but a closer analysis will generally show an undercurrent that will enable us to reach a better understanding of the *real* issues involved. At all events, a consideration of the present war's deeper significance will set forth the issue in a clearer light.

In the case of a conflict like the present one, involving actively almost four-fifths of the entire world and affecting the remaining fifth, the presumption is that there must be some undercurrent of so fundamental a character as to lead to the varied and confusing manifestations on the surface. It ought to be possible to resolve the surface complications into a formula that will account for the many-sided phenomena presented by the war. It will be my endeavor in these pages to show that the essential issue involved in this war is not political nor economic, but moral, and it is perhaps best to set forth, at the outset, the thesis to be established by the discussion, that the moral issue involved in this war is the recognition on the part of the world that an attempt to carry out national policies through the appeal to force, or even by the threat of force, is a cardinal sin against the moral conscience of mankind. A Hebrew prophet voiced the message over 2000 years ago, when he re-

minded those who stood for force and violence in his day, "Not by might and not by strength, but by my word, says the Lord of Hosts." The word is the idea, and ideas must make their way through their inherent strength and their direct appeal. We kill the idea when we attempt to force it upon the world, and this applies to the realm of religion as much as to that of political ambition.

This, then, is my theme—that we are fighting an attempt to propagate a national policy through military force, and that this issue is a moral one.

By way of approach to the subject, it will be well for us briefly to recall the aspect presented by the war at its outbreak in 1914, and to contrast that with the situation at the present time. For a decade at least preceding the outbreak the scene was being set in Europe for a gigantic struggle. The air was becoming increasingly heavy from year to year, and as the chief cause, though not

necessarily the only one, for the laden atmosphere we must set down Germany's aggressive policy in seeking domination in the East. The trend towards the East had become the watchword of an expansionist movement in Germany that had its logical outcome in the definite program of Pan-Germanism, and of which the Bagdad Railway project, inaugurated at the beginning of the century, was the visible expression. Behind the railway stood a strongly entrenched military government whose ambitions were for domination.[1] Since Europe had inherited from the middle of the nineteenth century the policy of the "Balance of Power" between the European nations as the sole means of preserving the peace, the military and political growth of Germany led to an alignment of France, Russia and England as forces to counteract the growing ap-

[1] This subject has been fully set forth in Chapter III of the author's recent work on "The War and the Bagdad Railway" (Philadelphia, 1917).

proach between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. As an offset to Pan-Germanism a Pan-Slavonic policy was pursued, looking to a union of the Slavic States of the Balkan Peninsula under Russian control. The situation was further complicated by the movement inaugurated by Greece for a combination of Balkan States against Turkey, followed by a break in the combination that was quite as serious as the short-lived union. Growing economic rivalry between England and Germany was another disturbing factor, and since under the historical traditions which have dominated Europe for many centuries, war is always imminent when relations between European nations become strained, the outbreak in 1914 had all the appearance of being a struggle between rivals for the position of supremacy in European affairs. The balance of power was upset or in danger of being upset. It is indeed amazing to see how many problems were confronting the Euro-

pean world in 1914, any one of which was capable of leading to an ordeal by battle.[2] To us in this country, living under skies which normally make for peace, war is the last resort, but Europe has for so many centuries been living under the shadow of war, that a long era of peace is abnormal rather than normal. Despite the unquestioned leadership of European nations in the arts and sciences, Europe, chained to hide-bound traditions, is nearer to the barbaric instinct to make a test of rival claims through the appeal to arms. It was a mere chance that the war did not break out in 1911 over the Agadir incident, as it was a chance that it came in 1914 through the firing of a pistol at an Austrian Archduke.

But what thus appeared to be at the outset a struggle for supremacy among European nations soon revealed itself as a contest

[2] For a convenient and lucid survey of these problems, see G. Lowes Dickinson, "European Anarchy" (New York, 1916).

of an entirely different order. When a few days after the opening of the war, Germany broke a solemn obligation and passed into Belgium as a short-cut to France, the step foreshadowed the passing of the war from a struggle for supremacy into a moral issue. The world was at first startled by the announcement, and then grew indignant on realizing the full significance of this act. Those who, while condemning the act, yet clung to the Germany of their ideals, who kept in their hearts memories of a Germany that had given the world so much that was of value, hoped that some satisfactory explanation might still be forthcoming, some explanation of an act so contrary to the traditions of faithfulness—" Deutsche Treue " —that had found a tender expression in German folk-songs, and an impressive one in the ethical systems of her great thinkers. The frank confession of the German Chancellor in his first utterance on the subject, that the step was wrong, and the assurance that it

was prompted by urgent necessity of self-defense, held out the hope that at least from this point of view the step would be not justified, for wrong *cannot* under any circumstances be justified, but at least given a less hideous aspect. That confession, however, remains to this day an isolated utterance, and its sincerity is necessarily questioned by the brutal acts that followed. In the light of these acts it is now seen that the confession of the Chancellor, involving the admission of not hesitating to commit a wrong, was merely a cold-blooded statement of a policy which stopped short of nothing, and which had been determined upon long before the outbreak of the war. Germany's ruthless treatment of Belgium, involving a category of crimes almost unparalleled in human history, revealed in all its hideousness the dastardly plan, long prepared, to terrorize the world into subjugation to the will of a military monster. Germany, like the Rome of Cæsar's days, had enthroned power as her

god, and ruthless power at that. Through this deity the national ambitions were to be carried out. That is the *real* significance of the fatal step taken on August 3rd; and Germany's conduct of the war from that time to the present, involving the application of all the cruel refinements of modern science to warfare, has helped to clarify the moral issue as it has united the greater part of the civilized world in the determination to stamp out a spirit and a policy which has brought upon mankind the bloodiest conflict in history. All other issues which appeared to be contributing causes for the outbreak of the war have receded into the background. The one figure that has stood out for almost four years against an angry sky is the man in "shining armor," determined at all hazards to carry out forcibly national ambitions. A new Constantine has arisen who sees, instead of a Cross in the heavens, a sword *in hoc signo vinces*—"By this sign conquer."

II

THE issue has been resolved through the policy followed by the German government in the conduct of the war into a moral one. It is a struggle of the civilized world against the systematic plan of that government to oppose the currents of the age by the exhibition of force. The German government claims to be waging a defensive war. That is true. But what that government is defending is not the boundaries of the country or the existence of Germany as a nation, but a policy that can only be carried out by military strength, a system of terrorization that if successful will spell the moral downfall of the world, as well as its submission to a Moloch of brute power. For this reason the civilized world, with the exception of the nations whose interests are for the time being so closely bound up with Germany that they cannot cut loose, or whose geographic position forbids a participation in the conflict—with these exceptions, the entire civilized

world has risen almost instinctively against the glorification of power. This rebellion is not due to hostility towards a people, nor does it arise from a desire to inflict an injury on a great country, but solely from the recognition of the fact that the resort to power in enforcing a national policy is an immoral act, fraught with danger to humanity and to humanitarianism. This is the real issue in the war as it has gradually shaped itself during the past three years. The war has become a crusade for saving the world from the domination of force.

That Germany with her noteworthy record of achievement in art, in science, in philosophy, in literature, in music, and in so many other domains should thus have become a menace to the world is a matter of bitter regret and profound disappointment to the many who from direct knowledge had learned to appreciate all that the older Germany stood for. But facts must be recognized, no matter how painful such recogni-

tion may be. Nor can personal attachment deter us from realizing the full significance of the moral issue, as also the necessity, for the sake of Germany as well as for the world, of fighting it out until the causes that have brought about the issue shall have been removed. No truer and no more penetrating word was ever spoken than the insistence by the President of this Republic, on various occasions, upon the distinction to be made between the German government and the German people. On the surface, to be sure, no such distinction exists or can exist, for in fighting this moral issue, our forces are necessarily directed against the people who constitute the armies of Germany. It must also be admitted, as will be shown further on, that the system of government which has created the moral issue has affected the mental calibre of the people living under such a system and their outlook on life, but the recognition of this fact furnishes merely further proof for the contention that if we

probe beneath the surface we will find the ultimate reason for the conflict to lie in the character of the government and not in the character of the people, for it is this government which stands out as the embodiment of material power, and not the people. It is this government that by placing force behind national ambitions has directly created the moral issue. It is a fact, therefore, that what we are really fighting are the evil forces let loose through the system of government prevailing in Germany. It is this system which has by a logical sequence led to Germany's conduct of the war in defiance of all humanitarian considerations, as well as frequent disregard of the postulates of international law. This system spells force; it translates the policy of a people into terms of force. It is a system which does not reason or argue; it points to the sword as its first and last appeal. Such a system naturally mocks at all moral considerations. It brushes them aside as the sickly fancies of

impractical dreamers. A system which is symbolized by a military machine, perfected to do its work with unerring precision, recognizes no law except that underlying its own being. Germany's conduct of the war is in consistent accord with the system; and when I speak of her conduct, I do not mean merely—though I do mean primarily—the recourse to such mediæval practices as the taking and shooting of hostages, and such primitive barbarities as wholesale deportations—the favorite policy of the old Assyrian conquerors—and all the varied barbarities in her method of warfare. I do not mean merely terrorizing the inhabitants of invaded districts by wanton acts of destruction to serve as warnings. I include also the elaborate spy system so carefully organized that its branches, like the net-work of an ugly spider, reach in all directions. I include the insidious propaganda, which has assumed enormous dimensions; I include the sinister intrigues and the rhetorical cam-

ouflage of the military and diplomatic policy, until the atmosphere becomes so thick with insidious deception that when an official utterance comes from Germany the world no longer takes such an utterance at its face value but seeks for some hidden meaning. It almost takes for granted that when Germany speaks through her Chancellor, she does not mean what she says, but something else. All this is a *direct* outcome of the system, and an inherent part of it; and it is evident that the condition of affairs thus called into being removes the basis for any understanding between Germany and the other nations. It intensifies a hundred-fold the definition of the diplomat of the old school, who was described as a person sent abroad to lie for his country. The world cannot breathe freely in such an atmosphere, poisoned by the asphyxiating gases of dissemblance and deception. Cruelty and dishonesty thus become the corollary expressions of a system of government which finds its

sole support in force—and cruelty and dishonesty are immoral forces that must be removed at all hazards before the world can again pursue the even tenor of its way.

The present conflict, therefore, I urge, is primarily a moral issue, a determination to strike at the root of the evil which has produced the present calamitous condition of the world. That root is a system of government out of keeping with the stage of moral development that the world has reached. In saying this, one is far from implying that the other nations of the world, including ourselves, have a clean bill of moral health. In fighting for the moral issue that I am trying to define, we are not putting ourselves on an eminence, with a claim to moral perfection, nor are we assuming the attitude of a supreme judge sitting in judgment over a nation. We are simply giving voice to the present-day conscience of humanity—a voice that is also heard in Germany, though not as yet with sufficient strength—a voice

which is determined to abolish a system for which there is no room, even in a world like ours, so far removed as yet from moral perfection. Aye, just because we recognize how far we still are from the goal of more perfect justice, towards which one hopes that mankind is aiming and striving, do we feel the supreme importance of fighting for the triumph of the cause which has carried us into the war.

For I hold that it is this moral issue which has led us, step by step, until the time seemed ripe to take the final leap which landed us into the midst of the conflict. There are those, probably many, who feel that this step should have been taken earlier. But here again, if we have regard for the undercurrents instead of being carried away by sole consideration for surface events, there seems to have been a good reason why we entered the war at the time that we did and not earlier. The moral issue was foreshadowed, as has been pointed out, by Germany's

breaking her solemn obligation given to Belgium. From the point of view of 1917 that becomes perfectly clear, but the moral issue was not crystallized until the war had proceeded far enough to reveal the aim of the military clique in control in Germany, in all its danger to the safety of the world. The significance of our entrance is all the greater because it came at a moment when the original aspect of the war had been entirely changed, and it had definitely become what it is to-day, a fight against the evil forces let loose through the military system, dominant in Germany. Even the vengeance for a wrong inflicted, which may prompt a people to rise in its wrath, is given a higher sanction when it is put in the service of a great cause affecting all mankind.

Our entry as a mighty people, bound by its traditions to peace and not to war, a nation pacifist by nature and by its convictions, solemnizes the war because of the moral issue involved. The spirit in which

we have entered the war further illustrates that issue. Think of the thousands of men and women who have left their ordinary tasks, many at considerable sacrifice, to devote themselves to humanitarian service—to carry the wounded from the battle-field, to win them back to health, or to give them such aid as is possible in their dying hours; to assist in restoring what the engines of war have destroyed, to maintain the morale and the courage of those facing the dangers and hardships of the trenches. Even before we formally entered upon the war, these volunteers by the hundreds and thousands came from every side, inspired in most cases by the deathless courage of France and Belgium —because France and Belgium stood up for the moral issue and faced annihilation at the hands of a strong, almost invincible, foe rather than yield to a system which refused to be bound by moral considerations. These volunteers, many of them entering as soldiers into the armies of a nation not their

own, were the advance guards of the large force which is now being gathered to swell the ranks of those who are taking their stand as the bulwarks against the encroachment of power—to hold the line that means the safeguarding of liberty and of civilization. This enthusiasm, more particularly for France, which is as marked as it is sincere, is a symptom of the recognition of the moral issue involved in the war. It is not prompted merely by gratitude for what France did for this country during our struggle for liberty and independence, for only a few of those who volunteered can be directly conscious of any such feeling. Nor is it merely love for France, strong and deep as that feeling is in this country, for many of the volunteers have never known that country, nor prior to the war had any special relations with it. No, the movement was, primarily, a response to the aroused conscience of mankind to bring about the triumph of the moral issue involved in the war. Men

and women have been moved to come to the aid of France in this war from the same feeling that led idealistic Frenchmen to come to our aid 140 years ago. In both cases the moral issue was the impelling factor, and that factor dominates the readiness to self-sacrifice shown by all classes of citizens throughout the country—aye, the anxiety of all to help, each in his or her way, in the great cause which has so completely transformed the life of this country within the short span of a year. The business man, from the magnate to the clerk, has left his office; the lawyer has closed his desk; the doctor has given up his practice; the teacher his class-room; the clergyman his pulpit—all to give themselves up to public service. Thousands upon thousands had volunteered their services in the army and navy before the draft was promulgated. Women of all ranks and women everywhere have abandoned thoughts of self to throw themselves into relief work. Their hands are busy from

morning to night to provide comfort for the fighters and aid for the wounded.

Let us not underestimate the meaning of this remarkable demonstration, nor in a cynical spirit pick out instances of selfish interest or the love of adventure that in some cases may have been contributing factors. We are witnessing a great movement and a movement that needs to be interpreted by a worthy motive. Is it patriotism? Yes, but not that alone. Back of patriotism—perhaps unconscious to many—is the feeling of the higher cause involved in the war, a cause higher than mere preservation of self, higher even than mere preservation of one's country. That deeper cause animating the entire movement of the war can be no other, it seems to me, than the aroused conscience of mankind, not to take vengeance, not to crush or destroy a nation, but to crush and destroy a system that represents an evil force—a force that is destroying the nation that it holds in its grasp, destroying and

crushing that nation as effectively—aye, even more so—than the armies of the world drawn up against the monstrous alliance between power and national policy. We are fighting for a principle, for the overthrow of a system that links national policies with power as the means of carrying them out. That principle needs to be established not merely to insure our own safety, but to insure the world against another outbreak such as the one that has now plunged mankind in deepest grief and suffering for almost four years. The moral issue involved in this war against the abuse of power offers the strongest support to the cause in which we are engaged, and the firmest assurance, also, of its ultimate triumph.

III

But the question may well be raised as a challenge to this proposition: Have not all the nations of the past and present, including our own, been made by war, by the ex-

ercise of power? Has not the world always been dominated by force? Is there any great nation that has not pushed its way by the exercise of material power, often brushing aside the weaker which stood as an obstacle in the way? This is undoubtedly true. But note the verdict of history on all attempts to carry the policy of force beyond *very definite bounds.* "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht," says Schiller. History is the supreme judge that has invariably pronounced the doom when even what is right makes a definite alliance with might, and depends upon power to carry out its aims.

Let us take, as perhaps the most striking example, the imperialistic policy of Rome. At the outset of her career the spirit of Rome was inherently opposed to the idea of conquest. Rome grew by natural expansion, and the fundamental principle of that expansion was not domination over increasing territory, but the extension of the scope of Roman citizenship. Even when Rome

passed beyond her natural borders, and stretched her grasp over lands lying outside, to the Spanish Peninsula on the West, to Africa on the South, to the Greek cities and to Asia Minor on the East, it was done in part, as the Carthaginian wars show, in self-defense against hostile and insidious neighbors, and in part in response to appeals of weaker nations and states to Rome, to come to their support against encroachment on their domain on the part of ambitious and stronger enemies. Recent investigations of Roman imperialism [3] have shown that it is not until we reach the days of Julius Cæsar, when Rome had already become mistress of the eastern world by her broad and unselfish policy, that the spirit of domination by forcible conquest replaces the earlier policy of logical and natural expansion under the guiding principle of extending the scope of

[3] See the admirable and splendidly written work of Prof. Tenney Frank, "Roman Imperialism" (New York, 1914).

Roman citizenship, without crushing the independent spirit of those nations that came under Rome's jurisdiction. Cæsar marks the beginning of a new era, the attempt to *force* the Roman idea upon the world; but Cæsar also points to the beginning of Rome's decline, which Gibbon significantly dates from the accession of Augustus. The new Rome succeeds in dominating the world, but at the cost of becoming, by virtue of her policy of forcible conquest, a menace that leads by the logical force of events to the division of the Empire, and eventually to the formation of independent states in northern and southern Europe. The underlying theory of the Roman Empire and the idea upon which it rested was a magnificent and inspiring one, to confer the benefits of Roman citizenship, "the heir of all the ages," upon the whole world. It actually did confer many of those benefits, despite the spirit of domination which set in, but when Rome enthroned power as the perma-

nent head of the pantheon she committed the cardinal sin which led to her own undoing.

Napoleon, only a century removed from our day, furnishes an equally striking illustration of the theme. That great and illustrious figure comes forward as a liberating force in Europe. As his armies swept through Europe, they carried with them the ideas of the French Revolution, the establishment of the sovereignty of a people in place of the domination of an autocratic group over a people. The Russian campaign, disastrous as it was for Napoleon, laid the seed for the movement that in our own days germinated in the liberation of Russia, first from serfdom and recently from official thraldom; and yet Napoleon, yielding to the temptation to join might with right, and making this combination the very foundation of his policy, became the greatest danger to the freedom and to the free life of the European nations, who were forced to combine against him for his over-

throw. The issue in the Napoleonic wars was at bottom likewise a moral one.

But, someone will object, how about Great Britain? Has she not also followed an imperialistic policy? Now, imperialism as it actually appears in the world's history is not all of one color. Its shades vary from the dark hue of the Assyrian-Babylonian policy, to dominate the world by crushing the independent life of the nations subdued, to the brighter shade of the humane policy of the Persian kings led by Cyrus. Cyrus reversed the process and granted a large measure of autonomy for the unfolding of national life among the peoples over whom he exercised a supervisory control. Persian imperialism approached the idea of a federation of nations under a unit control, though naturally it was far removed from the modern aspect of such a federation. It was Assyria whose example was followed by the later Babylonian empire that introduced the cruel principle of deporting the best and

most useful elements of a conquered population, so as to prevent a resuscitation of the national spirit. Sargon, the Assyrian, and Nebuchadnezzar, the Babylonian, as the representatives of dominating imperialism, deported the Jews to the Euphrates Valley and elsewhere. Cyrus permitted them to return as an expression of his more liberal imperialistic policy. Greek imperialism, associated with Alexander the Great, was largely a cultural movement, bringing about an exchange between Greek and Oriental ideas that led, as one of the results of this commingling, to Christianity. Rome in her *earlier* days followed along the path mapped out by Cyrus and Alexander the Great, while Great Britain may be instanced as an illustration of carrying on an imperialistic policy which, while it does contain features that cannot endure the strict ethical test, has nevertheless avoided the pitfalls which Roman and Napoleonic imperialism encountered. England's expansion, prompted

by her position as an island power, has not been carried on under the protection of an elaborate military system. It could not, of course, have been carried on without power, but that power has been kept within bounds.[4] England's policy has generally been tempered by a readiness to preserve the national life of those who came under her domina-

[4] Lord Acton in one of his letters, recently published, "Selections from the Correspondence of the First Lord Acton," vol. i, page 249, shows the distinction to be made between Navalism used by an island power as a means of defense and retaining control of possessions, and a military system which by its very presence spells domination. "A fleet with an army is an instrument of militarism. A fleet without one is not." It is a significant index of the aggressive character of Germany's military Imperialism, that in addition to already having the most powerful army, she was also determined to have a powerful navy. This meant Navalism plus Militarism, and naturally helped to bring on the crisis by increasing suspicion of Germany's ulterior designs. Lord Cromer, in his penetrating analysis of "Ancient and Modern Imperialism" (London, 1910), points out the general agreement between British Imperialism and the earlier policy of Rome.

tion. She went beyond legitimate bounds in two instances and paid dearly for it. One was her treatment of Ireland, the result of which has cost her such infinite trouble, and the other was the fatal mistake that she made in endeavoring to force her will upon the American colonies, and which cost her the allegiance of these colonies. But, on the other hand, Great Britain has in two recent instances furnished a notable example of an imperialistic policy conducted along higher lines, that form a parallel to Persian and to the earlier Roman imperialism before it became pure conquest and domination. In South Africa she has given a pledge of good faith by according to the Boers the fullest measure of political liberty; and in Egypt by the exercise of a wise protectorate she has brought about a marvelous transformation in economic conditions in that country, suggesting the resuscitation of the great prosperity that characterized the Nile Valley in ancient times. British imperialism

has moved rapidly within our days towards a great Federalized Empire, allowing fullest scope for the development of the various states and divisions, and with no thought of subjugation of dependent peoples.

The parallel, however, suggested by Germany's policy is that with Cæsarian imperialism, and the particular point in the parallel to which attention should be drawn is the totally different aspect given to a national policy the moment the attempt is made to enforce it by the appeal to *sheer* power or through the threat of force. Such an appeal or threat is in order only in self-defense, to protect the national frontiers of a nation, or to ward off a threatened attack; but when it is made for the deliberate purpose of aiding territorial or political expansion, to be carried out even at the expense of the claims or liberties of others, a moral issue invariably arises which must be fought out to the finish. The ambition of Germany to spread her commerce, to capture the mar-

kets of the world for the products of her industries, was not only perfectly legitimate but one that under ordinary circumstances would have benefited the world as well as herself. Taking even the main aim of Pan-Germanism, the control of the highway across Asia Minor, and regarding it as the means of opening up an important region of the world that has in the past played so notable a part in the world's history, and we must in a just and impartial spirit commend not only the main project of a railway connecting two poles of the East, Constantinople and Bagdad, a project of the same large vision as the cutting of the Suez and Panama Canals, but we may also recognize the great benefits of such an enterprise towards the resuscitation of the ancient East. An English writer [5] has recently called the project "a great conception

[5] J. A. R. Marriott, "The Eastern Question, An Historical Study in European Diplomacy" (Oxford, 1917), page 359.

worthy of a scientific and systematic people." But note how the project becomes a veritable curse the moment that a powerful government steps behind it and attempts to use it, by the threat of militarism, for a political domination of the East which necessarily could only be carried out at the cost of the interests of the sister nations of the world.[6]

Such a policy of domination, which would be intolerable no matter by what nation it would be attempted, is again a *logical* outcome of a system of government which recognizes force as its main prop, and which is built up on a foundation of force. If Pan-Germanism had arisen from a natural need of expansion, it would have been kept within the bounds proper to such an expansion. The movement might have been of inestimable benefit to the world in general

[6] See the further discussion of this point in the author's "The War and the Bagdad Railway," pages 117 *et seq.*

as well as to Germany, if it had led, let us say, in order to provide an outlet for a rapidly growing population, to the establishment of colonies in various parts of the world, with due consideration for the rights of those already inhabiting the regions to be colonized. But Pan-Germanism proceeded on the theory that the *power* of Germany must be extended; that Germany was to occupy a more prominent place in the sun, to use the phrase of her former Chancellor. It was power and always power, and nothing but power, that was urged in connection with the national policy. The expansionist movement was linked to the military system of government, until it became a mere appendage to that system, with the result that Pan-Germanism shares with the military system the condemnation expressed in the revolt of the world against domination through such a system. This aspect of Pan-Germanism removes what force there might otherwise rest in the claim of those who may

be regarded as the intellectual satellites of the movement, that Germany by her national policy was actuated by a benevolent desire to give the rest of the world the benefit of her civilization, to spread the German "Kultur," to use the conventional phrase, throughout the world, just as the Greeks scattered Greek civilization through the conquest of Alexander the Great, and as Rome wished to extend the benefits and privileges of Roman citizenship through her imperialism to the entire world. How can the modern world take kindly to a civilization that is to be forced upon it by the sword? How can mankind be expected to judge that civilization, when preached by the utter disregard of the sanctity of treaties and by the justification of cruelties and barbarities on the ground of their being military measures, as anything else but a thin disguise for imposing in reality the *authority* of Germany upon the world? A country extends the influence of her civilization by the teachings

in her schools and her universities, by the writings of her scholars, by the works of her artists, by the spread of her manufactures, by the examples of her citizens in the conduct of their lives, and by the spirit of her institutions. The spread of Greek civilization did not mean *imposing* the Greek culture upon the world, but a commingling of the cultural currents of the East and the West. Greek imperialism carried with it an exchange of ideas and of ideals, not the substitution of one civilization for all the others to satisfy the national conceit of a people, carried away by the delusion that the civilization of the world must be of one hue.

German civilization with its lights and shades is an outcome of the development of the Germanic spirit along specific lines and under definite restrictions. It is not accidental that Germany, as Brandes well puts it, has remained a center of conservatism in the middle of Europe, clinging to outgrown theories of the State, bound to mediæval

traditions of sovereignty and opposed to the new international spirit that within the past century has swept throughout the world, but has passed Germany by. German civilization shows the results of an exaggerated emphasis on nationalism. The very insistence of her leaders upon the superiority of her cultural achievements reveals as one of her serious defects the hostility to the larger international view. Granting, therefore, the sincerity of her intellectuals in their advocacy of the crusade for German civilization as the primary factor behind the national policy of conquest and domination, that advocacy merely reveals the wilful blindness or the incapacity of her men of science to realize that what they are endeavoring to bring about is the spread of *power,* not of civilization. The German professors are merely supplying the theoretic support for the military ambitions of the class that at present controls the destinies of the country. They are merely strengthening by their

attitude the tight grasp of the military autocracy upon the people, that wishes to strangle all independence of political thought and endeavor. The cry of a crusade for German " Kultur " is thus degraded to the low level of a decoy by the unholy alliance between power and national policy. Indeed, in the light of Belgium and the sinking of the Lusitania with its cargo of innocent noncombatants, it is not surprising (though exceedingly sad) to find German civilization held up as a mockery and a by-word. The combination of military power with cultural aims leads to a travesty of genuine " Kultur." The attempt to justify military domination by an appeal to economic policy, further supported by an erroneous theory of the method of spreading civilization, serves only to intensify the seriousness of the menace to the world involved in the special brand of German imperialism; and clarifies the moral issue that underlies the war. From whatever angle, therefore,

we view the conflict, whether from the point of view of Germany's conduct of the war, or from the point of view of Pan-Germanistic policy, which became bound up with the military system, or from the point of view advocated by her misguided intellectual leaders who play into the hands of the military autocracy and of Pan-Germanism, we reach the same conclusion, that in the final analysis the issue in this war is a moral one.

IV

THE moral issue has transformed a naturally pacifist nation in the course of the past year into a people in arms. Even those whose instincts, training and deeper convictions would prompt them to protest against war as in itself an immoral force—and I number myself among those who feel that war involves a temporary lapse into barbarism, since war cannot be looked upon as anything else than a survival of barbaric times—yet nevertheless feel that they must

conquer a natural repugnance to war in order to array themselves on the side of those fighting for a moral issue. The moral issue makes this war what has been called the "pacifist's war," [7] for it is a war against the martial spirit that lurks inevitably in a purely military system of government. The moral issue—the fight against the assertion of force in carrying out national ambitions—involves in its ultimate triumph the removal of the causes that produce wars.

It is from this same point of view that we must approach the corollary to the war, the problem of peace when the issue shall have been won. But before taking this up, let us consider two questions that confront us when we turn to a closer analysis of the moral issue. What is the basis or justification for our designating the fight against the domination of power as a moral conflict,

[7] See an article "A Pacifist Defense of America's War," by Joseph Jastrow, in *The North American Review* for August, 1917.

and, secondly, how was it possible for a people of great achievements, that stands out prominently in the domain of intellectual activity, a people with a great literature and a long list of thinkers, a people full of sentiment in their domestic lives, and not belligerent by nature—how was it possible for them to become involved in the issue which now confronts the world?

There are thinkers of recognized eminence who sincerely believe that the unfolding of power is the proper goal of mankind, suggested by nature in which power seems to be a controlling force. The stronger animal overcomes the weaker; the storm sweeps along and brings havoc to whatever is not strong enough to resist its attack. A battle is decided ultimately by superior strength, in combination, to be sure, with strategy, which, however, is merely the means of using power to the best advantage. Even in the domain of religion, power exercises its force. The gods in primitive and in many advanced

religions of antiquity were viewed primarily as embodiments or symbols of strength. Until the threshold of modern times, religions were spread by means of power. Islam glorifies the sword as the medium of enforcing the Koran. Intolerance and persecution, which fill many pages in the history of Christianity, are corollaries to the recognition of power as one of the allies of religion in providing for the spiritual needs of man. In ancient Hebrew and in many other languages, the general term for God means " the strong one." One of the common titles in the Old Testament given to the God of the Hebrews was " The Lord of Hosts," as the leader of armies. Nature seems to proclaim that the mighty shall inherit the world, and history often appears to justify the claim that to the victor belongs the spoils.

Now the answer to all this is simple. If we believe that man's destiny is to follow along the lines mapped out by nature, there is hardly any escape from the philosophy, so

commonly associated with Nietzsche, that the will to power is the ultimate goal of humanity, and that such religions as Judaism, Christianity and Buddhism, in setting up high ethical ideals as the flowering expression of religious belief, and inculcating the necessity of ethics at the sacrifice of power and of victory, run counter to the laws of nature. And yet Nietzsche himself, that profound and unhappy thinker, so constantly upheld as the advocate of might over right, furnishes the corrective to the pernicious doctrine. A thorough student and able expounder of Nietzsche's philosophy has, in a recent volume,[8] set forth Nietzsche's "superman" in its correct light. The theory of the "superman" represents, in a measure, the climax of Nietzsche's philosophy; but the superman is the one who is supreme because he has conquered power. He stands *above* power, he is beyond good

[8] W. M. Salter, "Nietzsche, The Thinker" (New York, 1917), Chapter XXVII.

and evil, because he dwells in a world in which he is no longer engaged in a struggle between two opposing forces. He is triumphant because he has no fear. The superman is merely the symbol of the highest perfection, and perfection must be without weakness as well as without fear. The superman represents the triumph of the ideal, and it is merely the fondness of Nietzsche for paradox, and his distaste for cant, hypocrisy and mawkish sentimentalism, that leads him to suggest the identification of his idea of a superman with power. Nietzsche never evolved a system of philosophy; he merely gave utterance to sporadic thoughts, often in a semi-mystic guise. If we strip his philosophy of paradoxes and inconsistencies—and the man who is fond of paradox is rarely consistent—we see that in its essence his philosophy recognizes the inherent opposition between the course of nature and the course of civilization. Civilization is essentially a struggle against

nature. Man's impulse towards the improvement of his condition brings him at every turn into conflict with nature. Human progress is the triumph of man over the forces of nature hostile to him when he tries to oppose them. Hence as man advances, he endows his gods with attributes that are contrary to nature. These gods are no longer the strong, the mighty leaders in battle. They are pictured as open to mercy, which is the willingness to make an exception to inexorable pitiless law. They are viewed as open to pity, which involves a modification in the law. The quality of love is attributed to them, which means the substitution of grace for law. This movement in the field of religion, totally changing the character of the old nature gods by giving them attributes that are not found in nature, but which reflect man's own ethical advance in opposing nature—this movement culminated in the strange yet impressive doctrine of God himself making a sacrifice of what

was dearest to him, in order to save mankind from eternal damnation through the force of law, which demanded that sin must be followed by punishment and cannot be wiped out. The natural condition thus becomes reversed, as man proceeds in his upward course. All those forces which stand opposed to power—and nature is the very synonym of power—are moved into the foreground. Progress is the challenge thrown down to nature viewed as power, the struggle against forces symbolizing might, and which, therefore, from this point of view become forces of evil.

It has always seemed to me, in my studies of the religious evolution of mankind, that in one respect at least the religion founded by Zoroaster, in the sixth century before our era, penetrated more deeply into the mystery of the struggle of man against nature than any other, by positing two forces in control of the world, a power of good, and a power of evil. The power of

good was Ahuramazda, the " resplendent in light "; the power of evil was Ahriman, the " dark." Zoroaster, in reaching out to a conception of divine government of the universe, logically and in a humane spirit, assumed that the supreme god, ruling his creatures by love, justice and mercy, could not be held responsible for the evil, the injustice and the suffering in this world; and so Zoroaster boldly proclaimed that Ahuramazda, the highest and good god, possesses all attributes except one. Ahuramazda was omniscient—but not all powerful. The forces of evil were under the control of an independent power which he called Ahriman. With this power Ahuramazda was represented as being in constant conflict, in the hope that eventually, after aeons upon aeons, the good will overcome the evil and become also all powerful as well as omniscient. It is not accidental that Nietzsche, attracted by this doctrine, chose to put some of his finest thoughts into the mouth

of Zoroaster in the volume which he entitled, "Thus Spake Zarathustra." When Nietzsche, therefore, makes Zoroaster preach the superman, it is the Super-God, the god who has overcome evil, that Nietzsche has in mind. Human history is the struggle of Ahuramazda against Ahriman —the higher forces in deadly conflict with the forces of evil. Nature, in so far as it symbolizes power, represents Ahriman; and civilization, in so far as it aims to establish a higher principle in the world in place of power, is Ahuramazda.

V

Militarism, the very embodiment of power, making its appeal to power, and knowing no other weapon than power, thus becomes an evil force fatal to progress, as it is hostile to humanitarianism. The unfolding of civilization resolves itself into a process of substituting for power a factor of a higher order, one destined eventually to overcome

power. And yet here is the ugly fact that as nations grow—and growth is necessary to a people—they also grow in power. The tendency is towards expansion, towards an extension of power in one direction or the other. What, then, is the safeguard against the abuse of power? How can the ambitions of a nation be kept within bounds so as to avoid the danger of an alliance with power as the chief, or, worse still, as the sole means to carry out these ambitions? The examples of Rome and Germany point the way along which danger lies, and they also point the way out. Power in the control of a group, holding the people in its grasp by means of military machinery, leads on the one hand to the principle of government over a people and to issues against which sooner or later the moral conscience of mankind rises in protest and opposition; and on the other hand, such a group ruling by power will necessarily be led to make a military system its *main* support in carrying out a national

policy. The two aspects of power, power over a people and power as the ally of national life, go hand in hand. These two aspects combined produce the menace that eventually forces the world to arm.

The fight against power is always a moral issue, and the triumph over power a moral victory. A menace, to be sure, may also arise when the power is conferred upon a group by a whole people. A nation, ruling its own destinies, may be bitten by the militaristic spirit of domination or conquest, but the danger is far less likely to arise. The saner and finer instincts in a nation will be apt to assert themselves against such an immoral alliance between power and national policies. The moral sense of the masses will rebel against the temptation to ride rough-shod over the claims of sister nations. The feelings of a common humanity are more likely to manifest themselves and to bring about a counter movement to a course, which the more far-sighted leaders in

the nation will see to be driving a people to its own undoing, by arousing first the suspicion, then the distrust, and finally the hostility of the world. The road along which danger lies is more likely to be avoided before it is too late, and at all events the people have it in their hands to call a halt when the danger becomes apparent. But with power in the control of a group, using its power to maintain its hold over a people, bringing about a system of government that is imposed upon a people and that does not receive its mandate from them—under such circumstances, the legitimate bounds to the extension of a people's power will by the logical force of events be overstepped. The people are powerless, and it is only a question of time before the combination of power with national policy will lead to a menace in which the essential issue will always be found to be a moral one.

It is worthy of note, also, that those periods in human history in which power is

invoked as the main support for carrying out national ambitions are not the ones marked by the best or the highest of human achievements. Rome was at her intellectual height before she entered upon the ruthless course of conquest and domination in Cæsar's days, despite the glamor that her success in arms threw over her widely extended dominions. Egypt produced her best works of art and literature before the extension of her dominions into Asia; and Assyria, the greatest military power of antiquity, was not a cultural force. Napoleon's régime led to a decline in France's prestige—fortunately only of a temporary character. It certainly cannot be said that the Germany after 1888 is greater in its intellectual achievements than the old Germany. George Brandes, whom I have quoted, comments sadly on the fact that a decline in liberal thought set in in Germany after the union of German States in 1870. "The old men of this generation," says Brandes, "are the young

spirits, inspired with high ideals, while the young men have linked themselves largely to reactionary ideas." Material prosperity and the growth of the political power of Germany during the past quarter of a century have not produced as many great names, either in literature, in philosophy or even in scholarship, as the period before 1870. The great era of philosophy in Germany set in with Kant, who appears at a time when there was no thought of a greater Germany. Goethe and Schiller flourished at a time when the German people lived under the shadow of Napoleonic domination, and Heine, the poet of freedom, sings his immortal songs while the people were struggling for independence. Warnings against the dangers inherent in the building up of a great military machine have been raised in Germany itself during the past two decades. The burden of Maximilian Harden's messages in his periodical, Die Zukunft, has been a steady protest against the po-

litical road along which Germany has been travelling since the accession of the present emperor. About ten years ago a novel appeared in Germany which created a profound impression and was most widely read. Its title was, "Jena or Sedan," and it boldly raised the question, which was better for Germany, the defeat at Jena or the victory of Sedan. The entire aim of the novel was to show the disintegrating effect of militarism on the ideals of the country and as exemplified within the ranks of the army itself. Many of the dramas produced in Germany during the decade preceding the war dealt with problems arising out of the military system; and the problems were invariably of a tragic character that revealed the purpose of the author to show the harshness and brutality of the system.

Such facts enable us to understand how it was possible that a nation that in every other respect, except in the supremacy of the militaristic spirit, stands for progress,

should have been led, by the subtle influence of a military domination over the life of the people, to become chained to power as the strongest aid in carrying out the national aims. Therein lies Germany's fatal error, her sin against the moral law which presides over mankind's efforts to overcome the hostile forces of nature. The alliance between militarism and civilization is an unholy one. It forms a parallel to the combination of the Sword with the Koran as the means of propagating Islam, and which has similarly been the fatal moral error of that great religion. The combination of power with national aims means employing Ahriman, the power of evil, to bring about the triumph of Ahuramazda, the force making for betterment and for moral growth.

It is precisely this unfortunate combination that has prevented Germany from passing, as all other nations have passed, from the principle of government over a people to that of government by a people. A military system of government arises either as

the expression of autocracy and becomes the means of perpetuating autocracy, or the system leads to autocracy. There are examples for both processes in human history. In the case of Germany, autocracy created the system. In the case of Rome, the system led to autocracy. The result, however, is in both cases the same. We obtain, as the theory of the State, government over the people instead of government by the people.

VI

The moral issue involved in the war is accentuated by the strange fact that Germany, alone of modern nations, has not realized the trend of modern history since the close of the 18th century. She has not heeded the message which rang out clearly when the shot was fired at Lexington "heard round the world." That volley sounded the death-knell of the old system which set up as its principle that government exists for the development of power and for controlling a people by the aid of

that power. It proclaimed the new principle, that the State was not an abstract symbol of power, but a concrete expression of the will of the people, and that national policies are to be developed and carried out by the sovereign will of the people, not by a group acting autocratically on behalf of the people. The French Revolution is the echo of the American War for Independence and established the same principle of government through the people for the guidance of Europe. Napoleon's armies carried the message to Italy, to Germany, to Austria, to Russia, and to the East. The revolution of 1848 in Germany, the establishment of Italian independence in 1859, the Turkish revolution of 1907 and the Russian revolution of 1917 are landmarks in this onward sweep of popular government. Germany started, indeed, bravely and nobly on her own struggle for independence early in the nineteenth century, when, largely through the enthusiasm of the students at her universities, the popular uprising took

place which succeeded in freeing Germany from the Napoleonic yoke. It is significant that the ruler of Germany at the time, Frederick William III, and his advisers were lukewarm towards the movement, for as representatives of the old system they instinctively realized that the liberation of Germany by the people might lead to the further attempt to liberate Germany also from the yoke of autocratic rule. Accordingly, after the Napoleonic wars were over, the statesmen and military leaders of Germany devised the present military system which brought the army under complete subjection to the government, to be used by that government for the perpetuation of the old system of government over the people.

It is a sad outcome indeed of a struggle for independence that the people themselves should have forged the chains that bound them to the will of an autocratic ruler, so that when the year 1848 came around the masses snapped at the chains but could not break them. Some steps, to be sure, were

taken towards the democratization of the government. Constitutions were grudgingly granted, which accorded a certain measure of popular control, but the basic principle of autocracy was unchanged. With the army under their complete control, the rulers of the German States could adapt themselves to the new order without forfeiting the essence of their authority. This was notably the case in Prussia, the largest and most powerful of the German States, which gradually secured and maintained a supremacy over the others. The union of the German States after the war with France into the present German Empire has further increased the domination of Prussia, and this despite sporadic symptoms of opposition, particularly on the part of the states of South Germany.

The government took advantage of the strong national patriotism of the Germans, kept alive through the memory of the older struggle for independence, and intensified by the enthusiasm created through the estab-

lishment of a powerful united German Empire, to further secure its hold over the people. It did so in a clever, and, on the surface at least, beneficent manner. It sought to smother rising discontent by providing in most efficient fashion for the needs of the masses. It introduced legislation for the protection of labor laws, which aimed to safeguard the health of workingmen and to secure them against the tyranny of capital; and it promoted and encouraged industrial and commercial expansion throughout the country. But at the same time the government in an equally systematic and efficient fashion built up the most powerful military machine that the world has ever seen, and which has served a double purpose: to keep the people under complete control, and to create precisely the power which a military system regards as its main support in carrying out national ambitions. The German military system sets its face resolutely against the abandonment of the old principle of autocracy, which assumes that

government is vested by divine providence in the hands of the ruler. The military government of Germany is a restraining force, granting the minimum of self-government to the people, making concessions only to popular movements for democracy when forced by circumstances to do so, and determined not to let go its grasp on the people. It seeks the perpetuation of its power over the people. The German government rested as strongly in 1914 as in 1848 on the principle that government was to be over the people, not by the people; and so, as a logical consequence, all national policies are not only in the hands of the government, but are guided by the small group which the rulers of the people of Germany call to their aid, and who are responsible to the head of the government, and not to the people. The government rules the people by the help of the army. Therein lies the crux of the situation. In all other countries of Europe the army forms the body of defense for the country; in Germany the army is the ally of the

government—its right hand—without which it would be powerless to enforce its will.

The combination of the government with the army necessarily leads to the enthronement of the militaristic spirit. An army is a symbol of power, of sheer material strength, and the government that employs the army as the agency of maintaining its hold over the people creates the moral issue involved in the war, and which we may now more specifically define as the determination to *divorce* national policies from power as the means of carrying them out.

VII

A FURTHER natural and disastrous result of a background of militarism to the national policy of a people—and one that is likewise closely bound up in the moral issue of the war—is the creation of a theory of statecraft to fit in with existing conditions. That theory further clarifies the moral issue. The theorist is not infrequently the man who is led to justify the status quo by showing that it is in accord with logic. Your theorist did

not fail to put in an appearance in Germany. Philosophers, historians, theologians, economists and natural scientists, in concert, supplied the framework for the ideal of the State as the highest expression of the national unit. The aim of the State was predicated as the acquirement of power. It has been customary since the outbreak of the war to associate the spread of this theory in Germany with the influence exerted by Treitschke, the Prussian historian, and to regard Nietzsche as the exponent of the system on its philosophical side, and Bernhardi as the one who illustrates it from the military point of view. Treitschke, however, is merely an exponent of a theory of government already in full force when he leaped into fame. He is not in any sense the originator of a theory of statecraft. He sets the stamp of approval upon a system that had been evolved by the military rulers since the early decades of the nineteenth century, and tries to justify it by providing a theory that will fit in with the facts. For

many of his views, emphasizing a militaristic background as essential to a powerful state, he harks back to a far greater, though also more cruel thinker, Clausewitz, the military writer whose elaborate work on "War," [9] in part philosophical, in part strategical, was of fundamental importance in the development of a system of military government in Prussia, and, later on, throughout all Germany. Treitschke's influence was profound during his lifetime because he interpreted the spirit that set in in Germany after 1870, with its insistence upon the superiority of everything Teutonic as the basis of the strength of the people. It was that overemphasis on nationalism, interpreted in terms of victory, achieved in the three wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870, which spelt power as the ally of the State and which led to the

[9] Not published till 1832, the year after Clausewitz's death. The last edition of the English translation in three volumes, by J. J. Graham, with an introduction by Colonel Maude, appeared in 1911 (London).

theory of the State as the highest expression of power.

Similarly, the philosophy of Nietzsche in some of its aspects (but not in all) fitted in with the actual conditions that prevailed after the '80's in Germany, but it is erroneous to suppose that the militaristic spirit was guided by a thinker who was neglected until a few years before his death, and whose influence became a factor in the national life only after the nation had been thoroughly drilled through the system itself.[10] It was said of a certain philosopher that he

[10] Our Ex-Ambassador to Germany, James W. Gerard, in his new book, "Face to Face with Kaiserism," has some suggestive remarks on this subject confirming the view here taken, and showing how absurd it is to assume that the military chiefs of Germany sat up nights reading Nietzsche in order to steep themselves in his theories. Mr. Gerard also shows that a propagandist work, embodying the plans and methods of the German military party, by Otto Richard Tannenberg, *Gross-Deutschland,* was of far greater importance than the much quoted Bernhardi, whose writings are to be regarded as a symptom of existing conditions, rather than as having any great influence in bringing about those conditions.

had been understood by only one of his disciples, and that that one had misunderstood him. One wonders what Nietzsche, who had little sympathy for the trend of modern Germany,[11] would say if he were alive to witness the enthronement of his "Superman," in the person of the present Emperor, as the highest symbol of the power of the State. What would he say of his superman, who overcomes power, pictured as the *embodiment* of power? But the Nietzschean philosophy, it must be admitted, can be interpreted as the prophecy of a triumphant military system, founded on the theory of the sovereignty of the State, and independent of the desires of those who form the State. It has been so read in order to provide a theory that will fit in with the facts, not to explain, but to justify existing conditions. The pamphleteers of Pan-German-

[11] While preparing his work on "The Will to Power," he expressed the wish that it might be written in French, so as not to appear to give countenance to German imperial aspirations. (Salter, "Nietzsche, The Thinker," p. 357.)

ism followed along the same lines of glorifying the growth of Germany's power by providing a theoretical substratum of an economic character.[12] Historians, theologians, and scientists joined to swell the chorus, particularly since the outbreak of the war, all caught by the temptation to justify the things that are, by endorsing the theory of the State that crushes the expression of the popular will.[13] It is indeed depressing to see the galaxy of university teachers and the exponents of religion in the pulpit unite to glorify the mailed fist of an

[12] See, for example, the work of S. Grumbach, "Germany's Annexation Aims," which is a most remarkable collection of documents and statements that have appeared in Germany since the 4th of August, 1914, from government officials, statesmen, historians, economists, etc. (Translated by E. Barker, New York, 1917.)

[13] See the collection of utterances of men of learning, as well as others, in the volume entitled "Out of Their Own Mouths" (New York, 1917). The collection is all the more noteworthy because the compiler, in a fair spirit, adds also in the concluding chapter, protests on the part of Germans against the ambitions and methods of the present government.

ambitious and restless ruler, who represents in his person a mediæval conception of supreme authority confirmed by divine sanction, *der Allerhoechste!*—a title higher than that given to the Almighty Himself.

The highest aim of the State is thus predicated as the acquirement of power. We must beware, indeed, of making the error of assuming that this theory, though pernicious in its ultimate analysis, is entirely without warrant. There are phases of this aspect of the State which we can well afford to consider in reaching a worthier conception. The State has a right to make demands of its citizens in the common interest, and even to ask them to endure sacrifices. But the theory becomes insidious when it is used as a weapon in the hands of a group for the purpose of developing power in two directions, as the means on the one hand of controlling a people, and, on the other hand, as a means of carrying out national policies. Patriotism does not spell blind obedience to the aims of the State as defined by a group

seeking self-perpetuation as its own end. The deeper patriotism, resting on the popular will, seeks to *direct* the aims of the State into the right direction. In a government that is carried on by the sovereign will of the people, the ideals and aspirations of the people are, under normal conditions, carried out by virtue of their inherent force, and not by the appeal to force or by the threat of a military machine.

It is not accidental that biology was appealed to in further support both of the theory that power was the proper goal of the nation, and of war as the logical means of carrying out the policies of a nation. The biological argument for war—that it corresponds to a law of nature to which mankind as part of creation is subject—can be used with potent effect for upholding a military system; and it has been so used by writers in Germany and elsewhere, whose frankness and boldness constitute the only redeeming feature of the horrible picture of incessant strife that these writers unfold as

the natural destiny of mankind. The biological argument for war, as also the theory that the goal of the State is to acquire power, ignores the inherent contrast between the natural drift of things and the conscious direction of civilization, which is revolt against natural law. Power and civilization are not allies, but hostile rivals. They represent the opposition between Ahriman and Ahuramazda. Civilization means the gradual elimination of mere brute force as the weapon to carry out man's destiny. Civilization brings to the front factors, such as consideration for the physically weak, the elements of love and pity, that are incompatible with the domination of mere power. We owe to Heine what is perhaps the most vivid picture of what happens to a civilization when it neglects the recognition of the factors that represent the triumph *over* power, and when ruthless power is placed at the service of civilization. At the close of his brilliant and still valuable treatise on

"Religion and Philosophy in Germany," [14] Heine, writing at a time when the creation of a strong military system in Germany had already begun to color the trend of philosophical thought and to uncover the dangers inherent in such a system, reveals with almost prophetic insight a glimpse of the time when the theories of the philosophers,[15] used

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[14] Written originally for the *Revue des Deux Mondes*. The passage, here quoted, is significantly used as the motto for a series of French documents illustrative of the war, and published by a French Catholic organization.

[15] As a supplement to Heine, one should read John Dewey's brilliant and penetrating "German Philosophy and Politics" (New York, 1915), which illustrates the manner in which the systems of thought produced by patriotic idealists issue into a glorification of unbridled power to carry out the aims of the State, even at the cost of morality and of the enslavement of the people. In this way it happens that even Kant's "Categorical Imperative" can be appealed to by the Emperor in support of his position, though Kant assuredly meant something different by his impressive thought that the call to duty without ulterior divine sanction is the highest expression of man's capacity to work out his ultimate destiny.

to support the aims of the State as the embodiment of power, will be transformed into action, with the result of bringing into play the demoniac powers of the old Germanic gods, when forces will be loosened that will sweep with blind fury over the world. He sees the old gods of the Teutons rising up, "rubbing the dust of a thousand years out of their eyes, led by Thor, leaping forth with his mighty hammer to shatter Gothic cathedrals." The savagery of war, Heine predicts, will be unfurled in all the titanic rage, of which the old Norse poets sang. One fancies as one reads these predictions that Heine is speaking directly to us—and it is also significant that for Heine this day of wrath, which he sees coming, is the precursor to the final struggle in Germany for the liberation from the military and autocratic yoke. In this respect, too, he may turn out to be guided by prophetic instinct. But for us the chief interest in the picture that he draws is the help that it affords in understanding the transformation that Ger-

many has undergone under the influence of the creation of a military system of monstrous proportions, made attractive to the people through its justification by intellectual leaders, providing the theory to substantiate the facts.

The combination of the factors that I have thus tried to indicate has brought about the present situation in which the civilized world has been forced to unite for the protection of humanity. The moral issue cannot be won until the liberal elements in Germany, which are engaged in the same struggle, shall have acquired the power to sweep the pernicious system out of existence, or until by a decisive defeat the present ruling forces in Germany shall meet their merited doom. There is no half-way victory in the case of a moral issue. It must be carried on to a complete triumph. The rattling of the sabre is the voice of Ahriman, the power that makes for evil. It sounds as a challenge to all mankind to come to the rescue.

PART II

THE PROBLEM OF PEACE

THE PROBLEM OF PEACE

"Above all Nations is Humanity."

GOLDWIN SMITH.

I

IT is from the point of view suggested by the moral issue that we should approach the problem of peace, to which, even during the conflict, our thoughts should be directed. Not, indeed, in the sense of detailing what the terms of peace are to be, but to clarify our minds as to what we mean by peace, and the kind of peace to which we may look forward. So far as terms of peace are concerned, it is presumptuous, as well as unwise, for the ordinary individual to discuss them—especially at the present juncture. The problems involved in peace terms are so intricate that they can be grasped only by those whose entire attention is directed towards statecraft. There are scarcely more than a dozen individuals in the world whose

opinions on the *terms* of peace would have the slightest value. This phase of the subject must be left to those who can speak in official language. But the general question of the kind of peace that the world needs, comes well within the scope of a discussion that forms a natural corollary to a consideration of the moral issue involved in the war. Moreover, the discussion of the general problem of peace is essential in the midst of the conflict for the purpose of creating an intelligent public opinion that will be prepared to assert itself when the time for peace negotiations arrives. A war like the present demands that upon the triumph of the moral issue involved, those who will be called upon to act for the nations now shedding their blood in such profusion and who in diverse ways are enduring a martyrdom for a sacred cause,[1] will be

[1] "A liberal civilization ascending its Calvary"—as Mr. James M. Beck, in a recent address ("The Peril of Premature Peace Parleys," p. 18), vividly puts the tragic situation.

guided by public opinion and not merely by the dictates of their own individual judgment. It is essential that the terms of peace reflect that opinion. There is perhaps little danger of these terms being drawn up in the interest of any particular class, but there is always a danger at the close of a war, on the part of those sitting round the conference table, of overlooking the main issue, through the failure of the crystallization of public opinion in regard to that issue. The fundamental objection to what goes under the name of a " German Peace " is that all proposals emanating up to the present, directly or indirectly, from the German government ignore the moral issue. There is not the slightest attempt made even to recognize its existence, much less to meet it. The German government has not as yet given the slightest hint of being conscious of the crime committed against civilization by the ravaging of Belgium, which had no share in the immediate

causes that led to the war. If it be true that the German people, at present carried away by the glamor of temporary supremacy over a demoralized Russia, are behind the government in its present unrepentant mood, it is merely an indication that the struggle for the moral issue must continue until it is recognized by the German people as an obstacle to peace that can be removed in only one way. But we, too, must be on our guard lest those acting for us should not fully realize that the moral issue also demands that never again shall it be left in the hands of a few, in any country, to bring on a war or to dictate the terms of peace. Peoples who pay the price of war must control the spirit hovering over peace negotiations. They can do so only by giving voice to their hopes and aspirations in so emphatic a manner that it will be heeded by their representatives. If through the crystallization of public opinion the resolves of the peoples in all belligerent lands shall swell

into a mighty chorus in the demand for a just peace, and, so far as it lies within human possibility, for a permanent peace, we may feel reasonably certain that such a peace, and none other, will be forthcoming. The details can then be safely left, as indeed they must be left, to the experienced statesmen who will be chosen to act for the people. It is in the hope of making a modest contribution towards the clarification of public opinion and of stimulating others who have studied the situation to do the same, that I venture on a general discussion of the problem of peace from the point of view of the moral issue involved in the war.

II

First, then, what do we mean by peace? Surely more than a temporary and patchwork settlement of the issues between the European nations that existed at the outbreak of the war, and which led to the struggle that appeared to be at first merely a con-

flict for supremacy among rival contestants. Peace congresses have hitherto been founded on the principle of trying to patch up an agreement between contending nations, instead of probing for the causes of a war, and of regulating the relations between nations according to ascertained principles. A peace congress after a war has generally meant merely a shuffling of cards with a redistribution in such a manner that one or two of the nations are given the trumps, and the rest have to be content with what they get. One is tempted to say that one reason why there have been so many wars in the nineteenth century is because there have been so many peace congresses. There were three notable ones, besides many minor conferences—Vienna in 1815, Paris in 1856, and Berlin in 1878. Each one of these congresses settled European affairs so clumsily as to lead to the preparation for the next war. Immanuel Kant, in a noble and notable essay setting forth some ideas on

perpetual peace, points out that a peace treaty should never contain the seeds of another war. Peace treaties hitherto have always contained such seeds. Because of this fact, peace congresses have in the past not established peace, but merely an armistice, of shorter or longer duration. The first step in the direction of real peace in our days was taken in 1889, when the Hague conference was convened. That was a genuine peace congress, as was also its successor in 1907, for these conferences devoted themselves to the consideration of the causes that produce wars. The first duty of a peace congress is to consider war, not peace —to interpret the deeper meaning of a war that has broken out, to consider the conditions that make for war, and to ascertain the principles that should guide nations in the settlement of a war after the fighting is over. Such were the functions that the two Hague Conferences took upon themselves. The circumstance that these conferences

were unable to prevent the war of 1914 does not spell failure, but merely an indication that the nations of the world were not yet prepared for peace. The great powers represented in these conferences were at the time filled with thoughts of war, and some of them with preparations for war, and under the influence of the historical tradition that dominated European politics to the outbreak of the war in 1914, war, active or in embryo, was a normal condition—peace the abnormal. How could it be otherwise, with wars following in the wake of one another in constant and rapid succession. There is scarcely a period of five years in the nineteenth century in which we do not find war somewhere in Europe, or in Asia, or in Africa, or in this country. As long as nations think first of war and only in a secondary degree of peace, as long as nations are prepared or preparing for war—and that may be necessary even after this war—how is it possible for peace to prevail?

Let us face the question frankly, for next to an inconclusive peace, the worst evil that can befall us is to have a muddled idea of peace. By peace, therefore, we should mean the establishment of conditions that make for peace. The Hague Conferences took an important step in this direction by the assertion of the principle of tribunals of arbitration for the settlement of difficulties between nations. If these conferences had done nothing more they would have amply justified their existence, for this step marks a beginning of the determination of the conditions under which peace is possible. Such tribunals had been convened from time to time before The Hague conferences, but the *principle* had not hitherto been accepted as an integral part of modern international politics. The second conference also proposed to discuss the question of disarmament, but the opposition of Germany prevented this desirable aim from being carried out. At the Third Conference, it is safe to

predict, the question of disarmament will be the primary one—as it is equally safe to prophesy that, assuming the triumph of the moral issue involved in the war, no nation will dare to oppose a discussion of so fundamental a problem, least of all Germany, which, chastened by her present moral isolation—which must be stinging to the pride of a nation—will realize, perhaps more clearly than any other, that her own salvation and future progress will depend upon the removal of the most serious obstacle to peace, the existence of a large and powerful military machine, so burdensome to a people and fraught with such danger because the machine is a symbol of power and of nothing else. To be sure, with a democratic form of government established in all countries, resting upon the principle of government through the will of the people, the danger of militarism arising from the existence of large armies will be diminished. Yet it is conceivable that even free countries may be

tempted by false leaders towards calling in power as an aid to carrying out national policies. Even republics are not free from this danger, for the lure of conquest may be dangled in a most attractive form before the eyes of a people. Power creates the temptation to use power. The existence of a large military class in a population tends to keep alive the spirit of war, and the spirit of war is only a few degrees removed from the militaristic spirit. A plan of disarmament, carefully worked out and carried out gradually, is therefore a logical step towards the establishment of a genuine peace. Disarmament is the corollary to the recognition of the principle of tribunals of arbitration.

A third fundamental principle for the establishment of a genuine peace involves the organization of some kind of a league of nations which will have the authority also to carry out its decrees for safeguarding the world against a mad outbreak on the part of any single nation, or of a combination of

nations attempting to act independently of the proposed league. Opinions are naturally divided, and considerably so, as to the form which such a league shall take. Many strong voices have been raised in favor of an international parliament (under whatever name), to meet regularly and to which representatives should be elected either proportionate to the population of nations, or in equal numbers from all the nations represented. Such an international body, representative of *public* opinion, and not the kind of opinion which emanates from diplomatic groups, could devote itself to the consideration of international problems as they arise, to the regulation of international commerce; to the safeguarding of the interests of weaker nations against encroachments of powerful groups; to removing causes of irritation to any nation, and to forestalling, so far as humanly possible, crises that may lead to war. Such a body would also take over the important func-

tions of the Hague conferences in regulating the methods of warfare for the protection of neutrals and noncombatants, and for keeping a conflict which might arise within such limits as to prevent the danger of the collapse of civilization, so seriously threatened by the present war.

With power to carry out its regulations, such a parliament would obviously be a body primarily devoted to studying the *causes* of war. Its functions will necessarily lead to such a study. It will be able, by virtue of accumulating experience, shared in by all the nations represented, to detect dangers in time to prevent their growing beyond control.

Above all, an international representative body will be a powerful incentive in promoting the spirit of internationalism, in order to counteract the overemphasis on nationalism which we have seen to have been one of the causes that has led to the moral downfall of so many of the intellectual

leaders of Germany during the present war. For one of the most discouraging signs of the present outlook is the frank opposition among German intellectuals to anything that smacks of internationalism. Ex-Ambassador David Jayne Hill, in his valuable work on the "Rebuilding of Europe," touches upon this point in connection with a quotation from the leading historian of Germany,[2] who goes so far as to advocate the abandonment of all international endeavors as an idle pursuit, a political will-o'-the-wisp; and why? Because Germany, he says, is always the loser in such efforts, obliged, as she is, to yield something to the interests of the other nations. The distinguished professor does not seem to be aware that he thus involuntarily reveals the inherent defect in Germany's national policy by the admission that it is incompatible with international considerations. How can a nation shape its policy on an assumption

[2] Page 138.

that it represents an isolated unit—more particularly in these days of international commingling of interests? That point of view, with its exaggerated emphasis on nationalism, arises logically in a country which depends, not upon the inherent qualities of its policy, but upon military power or the threat of force to carry out its ends. A nation that is under the delusion that it is proper to ignore international points of view will naturally be led to ride roughshod over the interests of other countries. Such a nation commits the cardinal sin which will rebound on the head of the one who is guilty of it. Brandes, in the prophetic passage which I have chosen as the motto of this essay, properly holds up as the contrast to the international spirit prevalent in the rest of the world, the position of Germany as a center of conservatism in a progressive Europe. The manifestation of the international spirit in science, in art, in labor unions, in business organizations, in human-

itarian endeavors, is one of the striking symptoms of the age in which we live. The spread of this spirit may well be regarded as the hope of the future. Internationalism will form the very basis of progress in the new world which will arise out of the crisis through which we are now passing. An international body, whether a league or parliament of nations, thus looms up as a further logical expression to be given to the complete triumph of the moral issue.

III

As against this larger scheme of a parliament or international body, sitting at regular periods, a more restricted scheme of a league of nations, primarily and chiefly to enforce peace, commends itself to many wise minds as more in keeping with the present still undeveloped stage reached in the manifestation of the international spirit. It is held that we have not yet advanced to the point when nations will be willing to sink

their national interests to the extent that would be required by the establishment of a genuine and effective international parliament. The blending of interests, it is argued, may lead, at the present juncture of affairs, to the weakening of some nations and redound to the unequal advantage of others. So distinguished an authority as Dr. Hill, whose important investigations in the history of diplomacy, supplemented by his large practical experience, give to his utterances special weight, is among those who question the advisability of planning at present for an international body with legislative functions and powers. Between the difficulties involved in voluntary adhesion to the decrees of such a body on the one hand, and compulsory acceptance on the other, an international parliament would find it difficult to steer a course that could lead to positive results. It is urged that such a parliament might be inclined to encroach on the internal affairs of a country,

or on what a country would regard as such, and at the present stage of sharp differentiation between nationalistic characteristics, involving opposite ways of looking at international problems, the most that could be hoped for would be the creation of a nucleus "for the ultimate union of all responsible and socially inclined nations." [3]

There is much force in such contentions, which have been advanced in various forms by others; but the objection need not carry us further than to suggest that the scope of an international parliament must needs be at first restricted to a consideration of the most *necessary* measures needed to establish a genuine peace. The objection, on the other hand, against a mere league of nations to enforce peace is obviously this—that it places too exclusive a regard upon the combination of the nations of the world against a disturber of the world's tranquillity as the

[3] "Rebuilding of Europe," page 187.

one means of securing peace. That view naturally comes to our minds through the act of Germany in bringing on the war, when she might have prevented it by accepting Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a conference at the time of the Austro-Serbian crisis. But must it be assumed that this condition will necessarily be the greatest source of danger in the future? If I am correct in the analysis of the war as involving primarily a moral issue, does not this issue rather point to an entirely different source of danger, to wit, the use of power to carry out national aims? If this be so, the avoidance of the danger for the future should go to the root of the evil—the control of an entire people by a military group. If the war ends, as we feel that it must end, by the triumph of the moral issue, the mental frame of the world will not be such as to suggest that the primary end of an international league is the protection against a possible criminal among the nations, but

rather to the furtherance of international relations as the greatest safeguard against the creation of such a criminal.

If the war, however, should close without the overthrow of militarism in Germany, then, to be sure, a league of nations, formed to *enforce* peace, will be the logical step. In such a league an unrepentant and unchastened Germany would have no place, for the world would still be in danger of an alliance between Germany and some other power or powers, bent on imperialistic ambitions of domination and conquest. A league to enforce peace may well be needed at the close of the war, but it is not the kind of an international body to which we should look forward as an ideal. Such a league may represent an intermediate measure demanded by conditions that may exist on the termination of the conflict; but the efforts of the world ought to be directed towards a combination of nations which does not rest upon suspicion, but which assumes as its

basis the desire of nations to determine the principles upon which the peace of the world can be erected.

IV

More serious are the objections of those who in a spirit of discouragement, which is not unnatural in the light of the present depressing experience, feel that international guarantees and decisions are of no value unless backed by the force to carry them out. The conclusion is drawn from the unholy alliance in Germany between power and national policies, that the only safeguard of the world is to oppose power by power. Ambitious nations or even nations without sinister designs of conquest, but which feel themselves hemmed in, or which scent the hostility of sister nations against their national expansion, will not be restrained by treaties or agreements, entered into by a former generation, which, it will be claimed, did not foresee the developments

of the future. Nations will wish to set aside agreements when such agreements are irksome. If relief cannot be found through channels of amicable diplomacy, the endeavor will be made to obtain it at the point of the sword. The world, it is held, must be prepared to meet such crises which may at any moment arise, by the threat of larger power against an aggressive or unconscientious member of the society of nations. This means that all nations, and especially the stronger ones, must be ready, through large standing armies, to assert their rights and the rights of weaker nations against unjust demands. Nations, it is held, are after all aggregates of power. The idealist may picture them otherwise, but the facts are against him. The league to enforce peace is of no value unless it is in a military sense strong enough to frighten the strongest possible offender into submission. Even such submission may not hinder the offender from making another attempt at a more favorable

moment, or when he thinks himself strong enough to take the gambler's chance against the whole field.

Now the answer to the contentions of the realist is assuredly not to paint in glowing colors a utopian picture of a purely imaginary millennium, even though the idealist might reply that many a dream, at one time considered purely fanciful, has been realized, even within the domain of international politics. Unless indeed we accept the biological argument for war, and further maintain in a frank, though pessimistic, spirit that war is man's natural element, and regard wars between nations as the means by which, under the wastefulness of nature, the destinies of peoples are worked out and progress, so far as one can speak of progress, is attained—unless we take this position, there is no more inherent reason why war should not be stamped out than why poverty should not be stamped out, or why eventually all contagious diseases should not be conquered

by the growth of medical science. The student who looks to the future does not delude himself by the idle fancy that if war is abolished the millennium will have been attained. The Golden Age will still be far off, for war is only one of many evils, and perhaps not the worst. The objection to the biological argument has already been set forth, that it ignores the inherent opposition between civilization and the display of power which is Nature's way. The aim of civilization is that of the " Superman," to overcome power by the introduction of other factors in the evolution of man that are distinct from power—factors that make for the triumph *over* power. If we accept this premise, the only ground for an attitude of despair regarding efforts at establishing a genuine peace as hopeless, would be to assume that the causes of war cannot be removed, and this is obviously gratuitous.

In the present instance, always assuming that my analysis of the situation is correct,

the cause is to be found in the combination of power with national ambitions. That cause, we have seen, was also active at various crises in the history of the world, when the world found it necessary to unite in removing a menace presented by some imperialistic nation or group. It has also been shown that the source of greatest danger lies in the concentration of power within a group holding an entire nation in control, and that the danger is far less when power is conferred on a group by the freely expressed will of the people. The moral issue in the present war arises from the circumstance that the power in Germany is wielded by a group that does not receive its mandate from the people, but which has inherited its position from an autocratic form of government, that has never been abolished but only modified to some degree under pressure exerted by growing popular opposition to it. Concessions have been wrung from autocracy, but the principle of autocracy has been

maintained, though there are signs of its tottering. The moral issue which involves as the condition of its triumph the disruption of the alliance between national policies and military power also points, as a necessary condition before peace can be established on the basis of the principles underlying peace, to the overthrow of the present system of government of Germany, which shapes public opinion in ways that are dark and devious, instead of being governed by the free expression of the popular will. The system corrupts public opinion, spreads an insidious poison that affects the intellectual classes and converts them into advocates of the status quo, instead of exercising their proper function to point the way out of the status quo. The system creates reactionaries, for the reactionary is the one who refuses to look to the future, whose face is turned in the wrong direction. He becomes an advocate of the pernicious principle of regarding what is as right, merely because it is. Hence, to

quote Brandes again, Germany *logically* becomes the center of conservatism in a progressive Europe.

Elsewhere [4] I have enlarged upon the necessity of all nations being organized on the same general basis of popular government, which does not mean a similarity of methods of government, but government on the fundamental principle that the authority of government rests with the people, and that government is an expression of the will of the people. That is what Kant, in his still valuable essay on "Perpetual Peace," [5] defines as the democratic "form" of government, towards which he felt after the French Revolution that the world was moving. The moral issue in the present conflict, we have seen, arises directly out of the

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[4] See "The War and the Bagdad Railway," page 137 *et seq.*

[5] Republished since the outbreak of the war, in convenient form, both in England (London, 1915) and by the American Peace Society in this country.

form or system of government in Germany, which is precisely the opposite of democratic. Given an ambitious ruler, under a non-democratic form of government, abetted by a group which like their chief is concerned with retaining its control over the people, and you obtain, as a logical sequence, the combination of power with national policy—power as the means of carrying out these policies. There can be no safeguarding of peace under such conditions. Danger lurks in every change in the political kaleidoscope, a danger which is all the greater for being hidden, until it is too late to avert the catastrophe. Political intrigues, secret diplomacy, the spy system, insidious propaganda, all arise as a logical outgrowth of a government carried on under a non-democratic form. If among some European nations that have passed on to the democratic form, we still find some of the methods of the older period followed to a certain extent, it is due in part to the principle of survivals—

and old countries cannot rapidly detach themselves from traditional associations—and in part to the necessity of European nations to counteract the sinister efforts of governments that still stand on the old non-democratic basis, and in which, therefore, the old methods are in full swing, constitute in fact the only methods, because they go hand in hand with an open or thinly disguised autocratic form of government. It is obvious that there can be no lasting peace if at the end of the war Germany still maintains its present system. If by any chance the war should close with the military party still in control, and with the Reichstag still a mere debating society, as it has been called, without being recognized as a responsible source of the government, the war for the moral issue will have to go on, and assuredly *will go on,* even though a truce be declared. Without the triumph of the moral issue, it is inconceivable that a policy of disarmament can be inaugurated by any conference

of nations. Large armies would have to be maintained in all countries. Tribunals of arbitration will be totally insufficient to prevent uprisings, and a league of nations will necessarily be limited to a league of defense against the danger of another attempt on the part of Germany to force her policies.

We are thus ever brought back, in considering the problem of peace, as in the discussion of the war, to the moral issue. Having regard, therefore, to the establishment of conditions that may make for enduring peace, we may now set down as the primary one the necessity of the same general basis of a democratic form of government for all nations. Such a form is the only one consistent with the spirit of the age and with the stage of political development, reached in the course of a century and more after the principle of popular government was first proclaimed in definite terms by the American Declaration of Independence.

If the German people are anxious for peace, as they are said to be, they have it in their hands to bring it about, by forcing the democratic issue in their own country. No enduring peace is possible with the present group in control of Germany, because no guarantees can be accepted from a government that has shown itself callous to agreements, and that gives no indication of any change of mind. The callousness and unrepentant frame of mind are the direct outgrowth of that system under which the present government in Germany works. No change is, therefore, to be expected until the system is overthrown to make way for a government which is by the people and in control of the people.

Once more, lest it be supposed that in laying this persistent emphasis on the moral issue in the war I am being misled by a foolish dream that the millennium is to be ushered in through the universal establishment of the democratic principle in govern-

ment, let me say that no such illusion is entertained by those who feel that without democracy a real peace is not possible. Militarism, as has already been suggested, may flourish in a democratic form of government. Imperialism of an objectionable shade may arise as a menace in the most liberal of republics, but the danger is reduced to a minimum—and that is all that can be hoped for—when a people has the government of a country in its control, instead of being controlled by it. The reduction of the danger is as large a guarantee against the occurrence of an outbreak as is needed to form a basis upon which a genuine peace may be built up. The history of the past century in countries in which the democratic principle has been completely established shows that the militaristic spirit has actually diminished, and that imperialistic aims have been curbed so as to avoid the abuse of power. The verdict must be given that democracies have, on the whole, justified

themselves by keeping national power within the bounds proper to the natural growth of a people.

Here, then, we have some of the main foundations on which peace can be established—the organization of all nations on a democratic form of government as the primary condition, and then tribunals of arbitration, disarmament, and an assembly of nations in the form of a league or parliament. Peace established on the recognition of such principles would be a genuine one, and not simply an armistice. The peace congress to be convened upon the termination of the conflict which is guided by these principles will be reasonably safe from the danger of planting the seeds for future wars, which has been the fundamental weakness of the peace congresses of the past. Even a settlement of this kind will not necessarily prevent wars from breaking out, for new conditions may arise which cannot be foreseen; but the danger is reduced to the pos-

sible minimum, if the world is determined to direct its efforts primarily towards the removal of the causes that bring on a bloody conflict.

With peace established on the application of the fundamental principles that underlie peace, the conference, which should be a popular body, consisting of representatives of all classes of the people, and not of diplomats representing governments, will be ready to take up the issues that confronted Europe at the outbreak of the war in 1914. To reach a settlement of problems, some of which represent a legacy of distant ages, will be a difficult task that will test the calibre of those who will have the privilege and responsibility of acting for the peoples of the world. If the analysis attempted in this discussion to look both at the war and on the problems of peace from the point of view of the moral issue involved be accepted, the people's representatives will at least have a safe guide to follow in giving the first con-

sideration, in the settlement of international problems, to the wishes and interests of the peoples directly involved. An enduring peace must be based on the rights of a people to determine its destiny, instead of having its liberties bandied about as was done by previous peace conferences, and which led to new difficulties and further conflicts.

V

As for autocracy, linked in the present moral issue to the spirit of militarism, that is doomed to disappear under all circumstances, because entirely out of keeping with the spirit of the age. It has passed away in Russia since the beginning of the war. It remains as a mere shadow in Austria-Hungary, and has been shorn of much of its power even in Germany since the outbreak of the war. Genuine democracy, to be sure, has not yet made its appearance in Germany, and cannot so long as the military party is in control. The concessions that

have been wrung from the military clique have not affected the theory upon which the German government rests, but they may be regarded as foreshadowing the weakening of that theory. The struggle between the Reichstag and the autocratic authority of the Crown, as represented before the war by the large body of Social Democrats, assumed a more threatening aspect in July of last year by the stand taken against the government by the Catholic Party; and though at present few signs of the conflict are to be seen on the surface, there is, nevertheless, an undercurrent of opposition which will again come to the surface when the people realize that the world is in no mood to listen to peace proposals of a military group serving the interests of autocracy. The outcome of this phase of the struggle we must leave to developments within Germany, and wait as patiently as we can for the moment when the popular will will be strong enough to assert itself in such a way as to lead to

the complete abandonment of the theory of autocracy.

Much more serious will be the struggle for the overthrow of militarism, and militarism is a greater danger than autocracy, for without the support of a military system autocracy cannot maintain itself. The attack on militarism, which during these trying three years and more has been going on steadily on the Western front, with the daily sacrifice of precious lives—the very flower of the nations—needs to be supplemented by attacks on the inside. It is being so supplemented, for despite the apparent unity, under the flush of temporary superiority over a disorganized foe, there are many indications that the moral issue is understood by the liberal elements in Germany, who even at the present juncture are raising their warning signals. The struggle may be long, and it may need a damaging blow to the military prestige of Germany, before the conviction will be brought home to the Ger-

man people that their country can extricate itself out of the position in which she has been placed by the alliance of power with the national ambitions, only through the creation of a new idea of the State as the collective will of the people. A new political education of the people of Germany must come about as the result of this war. That new education will represent the triumph of the moral issue. A chastened Germany will mean a liberalized and democratized Germany, free from the evils that flow from the present system. It is only such a Germany that will be able to resume her place in the concert of nations. The moral issue may be said to be approaching a crisis, symbolized on the one hand by the firm resolve of the civilized world to carry on the struggle to a triumphant issue, and on the other, by some signs of a sharpening of the issue in Germany itself. The war has already lasted beyond the time that would have been regarded as the limit of human

endurance. Is it conceivable that an entire people should be so blinded for a much longer time by a false spirit of patriotism as to believe, on the one hand, that the welfare of their country is bound up with a system of government that is entirely beyond popular control, and, on the other hand, that this people should not see that in its last analysis the system is the source of the combination of the world against Germany, and the reason for the moral isolation in which Germany finds herself to-day and from which she will suffer for a long time after the war?

The recent peace negotiations between Germany and Russia, revealing a most sinister policy of domination and conquest on a huge scale, are, to be sure, a depressing indication that there is not the slightest attempt on the part of the German government to realize the cardinal sin that has been committed by it against the moral conscience of mankind—which is a sin also

against the spirit of history. For that government is still steeped in the delusion that the peace of the world can be made by diplomats gathered around a table, with maps and pencils, to draw up new boundaries on the basis of victories on the field of battle. It is more than doubtful whether by such methods, in the present mental frame of the world, even a truce could be arranged, certainly not the semblance of a peace such as the world needs and is longing for. The delusion that victories on the field of battle can be made the basis of settlement between nations, again arises directly out of the militaristic spirit. It is idle to hope, therefore, that as long as Germany continues in the grasp of a military system, the delusion will be dispelled. Annexations, conquests by force, domination, represent the logical corollary to the alliance between power and national policies, when wielded by a group that holds a nation in its tight grasp. We are thus, at every point, thrown back to the

single issue involved in the struggle, whether we look at the situation from the point of view of the war, or from the point of view of the coming peace; it is a fight against the appeal to power as a means of government over a people and as a means of carrying out national policies. The two aspects are the two sides of one and the same shield.

The new order proclaims that a war is not settled either by victory or by defeat on the field of battle, but when the *issue* involved in the war has been won or lost.

The question might be raised against the contention which forms both the starting point and the final goal of this study of the war and the problem of peace, that the emphasis on the moral issue as the point of view from which both war and peace are to be considered, is an over-emphasis; that while this issue may represent the reason why this country entered the war, and while its triumph may be regarded as the aim for which we are sacrificing lives on the field

of battle, the nations of Europe are not ready to accept this point of view. Is not France, it may be asked, fighting, in the first place, to ward off an attack, and in the second, to regain, if successful, provinces taken from her forty years ago, and which she feels of right belong to her? Is not Italy fighting to regain provinces which she feels are her own, and is not England fighting to retain her hold on possessions, as much as to carry out her obligations as one of the guarantors of Belgium's outraged neutrality? What, then, becomes of the moral issue? Let us see. France is fighting for her defense, but against what? Not against an enemy whom she has offended, but against one who is bent upon further weakening her, because France stands in the way of Germany's pursuit of her imperialistic aims. The hostility between the French and the Germans was gradually passing away during the decade before the war. Strong as the desire of France still was to

regain provinces that had been wrested from her by the fortunes of war, it is generally recognized that she had no thought whatsoever of precipitating a bloody conflict in order to realize her hopes. The attack upon her which came as a part of the policy of a government that had linked power with national ambitions, places France in the attitude of fighting for that moral issue to the same extent that we are doing. As for Italy, while we may regret that on her entrance into the conflict she did not in a definite manner make the moral issue the basis for her participation, instead of presenting the spectacle of making a bargain—now established by the publication of the Secret Treaties[6]—it is nevertheless true that the recognition of the menace presented by Germany was the reason which led her to abandon the Triple Alliance. Her leaders have given voice to this view, and it is to be hoped

[6] See the symposium on "The Secret Treaties," in the *Nation* of February 7, 1918.

that they will even more emphatically, as the conflict proceeds, set aside purely national aspirations and thus strengthen the forces of Italy in the world's struggle for liberty and right. England, finally, has, through the utterances of her leading statesmen, emphasized again and again the singleness of the issue that represents the undercurrent in this war. If the expressions that reach us from the other side are not fully as definite as the message voiced on various occasions by President Wilson in statements that have already become historical, it must be remembered that the situation is much more complicated for Europe than it is for us. We are free from the entanglements of past European history. With nations elbowing one another, as is the case in Europe, governments that have received as a legacy from the past complicated issues resulting from the pernicious secret diplomacy that became a tradition in European Chancellories, find it more difficult to proclaim the new order

of the world, even when that order is recognized by them; but just because of the conditions which the present Europe has inherited from former generations, it is all the more important for us to distinguish between surface indications and undercurrents. Our voice in stressing the moral issue as the one which sanctifies the war and takes it completely out of the category of being waged for the satisfaction of national ambitions, however much such ambitions may be justified from other points of view, is already having a profound effect in clarifying the European situation. In fact, the universality of the applause which has greeted these utterances is testimony to the extent to which the same opinions were already held in France and England, only a concrete statement of them being necessary to evoke immediate response. The proclamation of the new order by the President of this Republic is rapidly becoming the most potent factor in leading to the complete acceptance

of the moral issue as the one that unifies the civilized world in the present crisis. A broad view of the European situation, with due regard to conditions there that necessitate a slower pace, makes it evident that what is stirring England, France and Italy at the present moment to a determined resistance is the recognition of the issue which has brought us into the conflict.

The civilized world proclaims in chorus to-day, as did Luther of old, "Here we stand; we cannot do otherwise"—and will not. There is only one response possible to such a cry, the triumph of the issue by the overthrow of the system which is the cause of the present calamitous condition of the world. Nor need we have any fear of the ultimate outcome if we but keep our eyes fixed on the one supreme issue. That condition is indeed of major importance. Such a concentration involves that for the present all questions that confronted Europe at the outbreak of the war must, until

the time for peace negotiations arrives, be moved into the background. Above all, the imperialistic aims of any of the nations involved in the war must be frankly pushed aside, as a necessary condition to the crushing of the militaristic spirit in the future, wherever it may make its appearance. The fight for a moral principle is weakened by the intrusion of selfish interests, however much those interests may be justified on political grounds or on the grounds of expediency. The moral issue of the war further demands that all those fighting on the side of freedom and liberty must recognize the inherent injustice of dividing up any part of the world among strong nations, to the disadvantage of weaker ones, and in disregard of the rights and happiness of the people inhabiting the region upon which a strong nation fixes its eyes. Exploitation must give way to coöperation in the triumph of the moral issue. Annexation must yield to a policy of resuscitating

regions that through misrule or through other causes have been allowed to fall into decay. That applies particularly to the East, which as the mother of civilization and the birthplace of the great religions of the world, and fertile source of art and literature, must be resuscitated, not conquered.[7]

And, lastly, this one word of warning for those of us more particularly who are not engaged in the actual struggle, but who are watching it with anxious hearts. Let us not becloud the issue by harboring the spirit of vengeance or by encouraging the spirit of hatred. To hate an entire people is an immoral act—aye, almost a crime; and when fighting for a lofty principle, we are risking the concentration of all our strength on the main issue by translating the principle for which we are fighting into terms of hatred. For those who are in the field of action, the

[7] See further on this aspect of the situation, the author's "The War and the Bagdad Railway," p. 140 *et seq.*

warning is unnecessary, for when face to face with the foe, the tragedy of the situation is so overwhelming as to drive away every thought except that of the horror of the struggle. Such, at all events, is the testimony of those who come back and tell us of the feelings engendered on the battlefield. In the moment of supreme danger, when about to kill one whom one does not know, and in many cases one does not see, passion may be an impelling factor, but not hate. But for us who do not incur personal danger, while our indignation at wrongs committed should be strong, while we should condemn the brutalities and atrocities of the war without mercy, while we should not yield in our determination to carry the issue to a triumphant conclusion, we weaken the cause in which we are engaged by converting our just indignation into hatred. A moral issue stands high above hatred. It needs no hatred to inspire those who believe in it with confidence in its ultimate triumph.

The idea of what is right and just makes its way by its inherent force, and the idea in the present conflict is Ahuramazda, the power that makes for good. Hatred is in the service of Ahriman, the power of evil. The triumph of the moral issue involved in the war is the victory of Ahuramazda over Ahriman, the overcoming of evil by the overthrow of power—the enthronement of right as against might; and this will be followed, as surely as the day follows the night, by the dawn of a new era of light and peace for the entire world.

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